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The Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard
·Debate
Stephen L. Carter·
I. The Problem: Scientific Freedom in an Activist State
Enormous hubbub - as evidenced by this symposium - has
greeted the decision by Judge John Sirica, a good year ago now, in
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler. l There the trial court issued
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the release of recombinant
DNA into the environment until the National Institutes of Health,
under whose auspices the release was to take place, complied with
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. 2 That,
at least, is how a lawyer would describe the case. The scientific re-
searcher's description of the case would probably be somewhat less
complex: A court halted a scientific experiment. Government stood
in the way of scientific progress, and that, in the view of the re-
searcher, is simply outrageous. Perhaps the result in Foundation on
Economic Trends is indeed outrageous, but outrageous or not, the
court's action is at the very least a signal that times have changed.
At one time, the American public agreed with practitioners of the
art that science was an "endless frontier," that scientific knowledge
was itself a good thing, that there simply were no major problems
not ultimately amenable to technological solutions. 3 Yet it is impor-
tant to understand how brief that era was. Scientists have been
viewed with suspicion for about as long as there have been scien-
tists, and government efforts to manipulate or suppress their work
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are nothing new.-l Only after the Second World War, which many
saw as having been won in large measure by the superior technolog-
ical expertise of the United States, did matters begin to change; the
conquest of near space in the sixties fueled the optimism.
In the general disillusionment with authority and institutions that
was wrought by (or perhaps reflected in) the Vietnam War abroad
and civil strife at home, science was toppled from its pedestal. No
longer were scientific researchers automatically trusted and left
alone to improve society; no longer was all knowledge conceded to
be good. Perhaps, some whispered, scientists had summoned spirits
that would have been better left alone. True, the genie cannot be
stuffed back into the bottle, but - so the question arose -
shouldn't we begin to be awfully careful about which bottles we
open next? Scientific researchers would generally reply that trying
to predict progress in order to control it is quite impossible; fright-
ened lay people would argue that something had to be done "before
it's too late." And thus the battle was joined.
In the old days when basic science was thought immune from
moral censure, no judge would have pondered seriously an urgent
request that some experiment be halted. Only after the first few de-
cades of the twentieth century did American ideology begin to take
seriously the idea that government is more than a formal mechanism
for enforcing the essentially private ordering of resources and
resolving private disputes. The modern American state intervenes
in nearly every aspect of the lives of its constituents, all in the name
of improving the lot of the society as a whole." Under an interven-
tionist ideological regime, there may no longer be persuasive rea-
sons for scientists to consider themselves possessed of a special
immunity.
Thus an American scientist who today decides to perform an
4. Often such attempts result from the efforts of various organized religions that
formerly dominated secular politics in most of the world. For discussion of the ways in
which religion has worked to restrain scientific progress, see,J. DRAPER, HISTORY OF THE
CONFLICT BElWEEN Rt:LIGION AND SCIENCE (1889); B. FARRINGTON, SCIENCE AND POLI-
TICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (1939); A. D. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCI-
ENCE WITH THt:OLOGY (2 vols. 1900). But more technologically advanced regimes have
also auempted 10 imerfere with free scienlific inquiry. See, e.g., A. BEYERCHEN, SCIEN-
TISTS UNDt:R HITLER: POLITICS AND THE PHYSICS COMMUNln' IN THE THIRD REICH 195-
98 (1977) (Nazi Germany); L. GRAHAM, THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE
COMMUNIST PARn", 1927-1932 (1967) (Soviet Union). Nor has the United States been
immune from the temptation to imerfere. See, e.g., Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105,289
S.W. 363 (1927) (state may forbid teaching of evolution); S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF
MAN 30-72 (1981) (influence of racism and xenophobia on theories of imelligence).
5. See Ackerman, Fon'word: Lau· ill all .-Ielit'isI SIale, 92 YALE L.J. 1083 (1983).
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open-air test of recombinant DNA must surely expect careful scru-
tiny before the experiment is permitted to proceed. The scrutiny
may take the form of litigation, of affirmative legislation, of adminis-
trative regulation, or simply of public protest. Whatever the form,
the scrutiny will lead inevitably to expense and delay - and may
come in spite of the researcher's profoundly held conviction that the
experiment is perfectly safe. The scrutiny may seem wasteful, it may
seem inefficient, it may seem counter-productive, it may seem un-
scientific - it may, in sum, seem to fit the definition of anyone of
the many terms we have developed to ridicule those not as clever as
we are. But in the closing years of the twentieth century, this careful
scrutiny is also something else: It is deeply American.
The debate never ends, and perhaps it never should. The current
topic scarcely matters. The competitors are always the same. On
one side are the scientists, well-educated, confident, curious about
the natural world, anxious to test their hypotheses, impatient with
those who would stop them. On the other side is the lay public, less
educated, uncertain, frightened by what they view as unnatural ex-
periments, distrustful of scientific hypotheses, determined to elimi-
nate the sources of their concern.6 Somewhere in between, faced
with demands from both sides, is the government - and govern-
ment policy is ultimately the issue.
The debate sparking the instant symposium involves those public
fears often collected under the term "biohazard" - particularly
fears about the experimental release of recombinant DNA into the
environment, but more generally, any experiments regarding what
is often called The New Biology, the biology promising to reshape
humankind rather than simply to cure its multifarious ills. The
Foundation on Economic Trends case involved an effort by researchers
at the University of California to release into the environment ge-
netically altered bacteria intended to improve the frost tolerance of
potato plants. Opposition was stirred only by the means, not by the
end. The pO'sture of the parties to the litigation illustrates the battle
lines in the biohazard debate: The scientists want to test theories
about the effect of their creations on the environment and the effect
of the environment on their creations; their opponents are worried
about precisely the same thing.
In debates of this kind, the scientists are typically labeled intoler-
ant, their opponents typically dismissed as irrational. From the point
(i. Some scienlists, of course, will join the lay public in its opposition. and the text
should he read as including them among the opponents.
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of view of the scientists, the matter is quite often a simple one: 'fhe
scientists know what is going on, and members of the lay public do
not. As a consequence, the scientists contend, their reasoned COI1-
'elusions, not popular hysteria, ought to form the basis of policy.
The public sees the matter in quite another way: An indifferent sci-
entific community is eager to subject the public to risks that are ill-
understood. Rather than permit this, the public insists, the political
process should do its job of protecting citizens from harm. An enor-
mous literature focuses on how best to design and implement poli-
cies that somehow lend comfort to both sides. 7
My purpose in this essay is not to join that debate. Instead, I want
to suggest why, unless scientific researchers shift their tactics, the
Foundation on Economic Trends decision is likely to be just one of many
successful efforts to restrain or regulate a scientific enterprise previ-
ously thought to be beyond the reach of the American political cul-
ture, a culture in which the fears of the public, whether rational or
not, quite often form the basis for government decision. Scientific
researchers seeking freedom to experiment might fight their absorp-
tion into this political culture, arguing that they know better than
the lay public what the risks are. But unless the researchers can con-
vince a court that some constitutional right is being violated or un-
less they can persuade political actors to ignore public pressure, the
regulation will continue to expand. After explaining why these tac-
tics are likely to fail, I will set out my alternative: That rather than
seeking ways of circumventing public opposition to their work, re-
searchers pursuing controversial experiments will best serve the
long-run interests of the scientific endeavor and of the American
democratic ideal by embarking on a campaign to win back the public
trust that science once enjoyed.
II. Biohazard and The Bellman
The debate over biohazards resembles the debates that have
arisen over hazards of many other kinds when experts and a con-
cerned public have disagreed. When the name-calling is over, these
7. Sff, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, JR. & D. HDmERso~, Tilt:
UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QtfALlTY (1974): Ban'lon, Copillg i/'ith TI'I'III/o!-
ogy Through the Lega! P1'OCfSJ, 62 CORN. L. Rt;Y. H17 (1977): Yellin. lIigh Ii'rllI"'!")!.)' IIlId tIll'
Courts: .\'urleUl· POll'eI' alld the -"eed jor Iwtitutiolla! Re/orm, 94 HAR\·. L. RH. -tH9 (I !lH Il
[hereinafter ('iled as Yellin, lI(s:h Techno!ogy I. I alll nol sure lhal Ih(' eH'orl will ner pron'
fruilful, bUI I admire lhose who undertake it. I do nOI. however, nmsidn Ihose who
engage in lhis particular debale as above Uilicislll. See Carler. Sepal'l/tism (/1/(/ Skl'/Jtinl/II.
92 YALE L..J. 13:J4 (19H3).
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debates share a common theme: Should the experts playa special
role, or should the uninformed public be permitted to rule? This
theme is reminiscent of the view presented by Lewis Carroll in his
satirical epic poem, The Hllnting of the Snark. H For the benefit of
those unfortunates who have never read it, I should explain that the
poem recounts the adventures of a ship with a most unusual crew
(the name of each member, from the Beaver to the Boots to the
Barrister, begins with the same letter) during the search for a crea-
ture known as the Snark. Most relevant to the instant debate is Car-
roll's description of one of the reasons the crew so admires its
captain, the Bellman:
He had bought a large map representing the sea,
Without the least vestige of land:
And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be
A map they could all understand.
"What's the good of Mercator's North Pole and Equators,
Tropics, Zones, and Meridian Lines?"
So the Bellman would cry: and the crew would reply
"They are merely conventional signs!"
"Other maps are such shapes, with their islands and capes!
But we've got our brave Captain to thank"
(So the crew would protest) "that he's bought us the best -
A perfect and absolute blank!"9
Carroll's story is obviously a lampoon, and the scientists would no
doubt be quick to say that he is poking fun at the crew: They are
know-nothings, who would rather have a simple answer than a right
one. If the truth is too complex, then fiction will suffice. And per-
haps the crew (and through them, the know-nothing mob) is indeed
the object of Carroll's satire. Another point of view, however, is
also plausible: He is poking fun at the readers.
After all, what is it that makes the excerpt so funny? It is, of
course, that we all understand what the crew does not, that if the
map does not use the "conventional signs" that the crew condemns,
the ship will never get where it is going. Yes, construing the con-
ventional signs might be difficult, but the difficulty is unavoidable if
you want to get anywhere. And if you find reading the map too diffi-
cult, then find someone who knows how to read the map, tell her
where you want to go, and let her figure out the best way to get
there.
8. L. CARROLL, The /luT/ling of Ihe Snark, in TilE COMPl.ETE II.LlJSTRATED WORKS OF
LEWIS CARROLL 177 (E. Guiliano ed. 1982) [hereinafter ciled as SNARK I.
9. /d. al 185-86.
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So we understand that the crew is foolish. The members of the
crew, however, may also understand that they may not get where
they want to go without a more conventional map. Only our own
prejudices translate their preferences into bad things. By laughing
at the crew, we are insisting that they must want to get somewhere,
and further, that they must follow the most expeditious path in get-
ting there. No meandering, no stopping to admire the sunset or a
daffodil, no frolicking for frolic's sake. In laughing at them, in other
words, our attitude is very much policy-analytic: Tell the experts
what you want, and the experts will develope a plan for its
achievement.
But what a presumption! Who are we to say to the crew members
that they have no right to select their own end, or to choose to pur-
sue no end at all, or to decide on an end and then decide to pursue
it poorly, perhaps by selecting a seemingly irrational means for
achieving it? So what if the crew's map won't take them any place
but in a circle? Perhaps around and around in a circle is the only
way they really wish to travel, or perhaps they want to travel in a
circle and call it a straight line. 10 There is an enormous arrogance,
indeed, an anti-democratic spirit, in laughing at the crew for its fool-
ishness. More informed debate may be better than less informed
debate, but the amount and nature of the information needed will
vary according to the objectives of the discussion. If the crew must
decide how most efficiently to reach a particular map point, then a
debate without the aid of conventional signs is likely to be quite un-
informed. But the crew may doubt - for moral reasons, say - that
the map point in question should ever be reached. The crew might
have other purposes as well: to decide what it would most enjoy
doing, or to fool itself into believing that it knows what is going on.
Unless the crew and the expert map-readers share a common objec-
tive, there is no basis for saying that the crew lacks adequate infor-
10, This line of argument is inspired by Arthur Leffs observations regarding eH()r!s
10 use the 100ls of economics 10 analyze the efficiency with which institlltiollS achicvc
their stated ends:
[IJf one thoroughly accepts the idea that the results people actuallv achieve for
themselves are the ones that. among the available alternatives. they wantcd to
achieve. then one trembles on the edge of a worrisome paradox, , , ,One cannol
say lhat though A achieved state X. he "really" wanted to achieve stale Y (and t'er·
tainly not lhat he oughl 10 have wanted to achieve state Z). because the only lcst of
the "rightness" of his choice. for him. given his circumstances. is whal he did,
.. , . [NJothing can be considered inefficiently achieved until one discO\'ers whal
the aim of the activity was.
LefT. Econolll;c .-1na(l'S;S of Law: 50lllf RfalislII .-1bo/l1 ,\'olll;nalislII. 60 \'A, L. RH'. -t51. -tti:\·ti-t
(197-t),
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mation. And if we insist that the crew has chosen the wrong
objective, then perhaps we the readers are the real butts of Carroll's
joke.
From this perspective, the biohazard debate should look a bit dif-
ferent. If the issue is one of likely effects, the scientific experts
surely have more information than do lay people. But this does not
make the lay opponents wrong in their opposition, and it certainly
does not render them Luddites or nihilists. ''I'm just afraid, can't
say quite why" is not an argument that carries much force in expert
debate, but it is far from clear why it should not carry substantial
weight in the political arena. After all, whatever one's view of the
nature of American democracy, at least one of its functions is surely
the enforcement of the popular will. I I Voters are not required to
demonstrate policy expertise before they are permitted to vote.
In this sense, the scientists and their opponents may be talking
past each other. The scientists argue as though the only issue is how
the signs on the map should be interpreted; for the fearful public,
however, there is the logically prior question of which map is the
appropriate one to use - or whether using a map is even a good
idea. The scientists, of course, put a good deal of faith in the ability
of experts to construe the signs the public may find confusing or
suspicious; the public may prefer to place its faith in a Bellman, in
someone who will assure them that matters beyond their under-
standing need not be understood.
Thus the easy answer may be that the scientists have no case, that
unless they are prepared for the rough and tumble of political argu-
ment, they ought not to qualify for special treatment. That easy an-
swer, however, is a bit too quick. In the post-New Deal era, the
public is not always given its free choice of maps. Even when a
choice is made, the public does not always retain the option of over-
ruling the expert map-readers. 'since the Second World War, the
political process (including, for this purpose, the judicial process)
has chosen to take some issues aside and to try to place them more
or less beyond the reach of partisan politics. To take but a single
example, when the public decreed that the air and water must be
cleaned, the Congress established an expert agency to figure out
just how clean was clean enough - and how to determine when that
II. Technological advance may cast some additional doubt on this point. See Carter.
Technology. Democracy. and the /l4anipulation of COIlJent (Book Review), 93 YALE LJ. 581
(1984).
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level of cleanliness had been reached. I ~ As the government has be-
,come more activist, more issues have been insulated from politics
(at least in theory) and turned over to professionals for manage-
ment. If an agency seems not to be doing its job, then the courts
exist to enforce various procedural guarantees written into the en-
abling leg·islation. Everyone has a say and the decisions are (again
'in theory) based on the most complete information available.':~ In
short, the American constitutional democracy is not a dictatorship
of the uninformed; accommodations can be made when expert opin-
ion is thought to be important. Consequently, the demand by scien-
tists that they not be subject to rules they consider ridiculous may
not be as undemocratic as it seems.
But democratic or not, agency treatment may not be the answer.
First, as I have argued elsewhere, such special treatment outside the
easy reach of pluralist politics is not automatic; those who seek it
must explain why what they do is so different from what others do. 1-1
Second, administrative agencies are not necessarily as "independ-
ent" as their mandates implyY> Every fresh election brings a new
wave of policy reversals, and the expert agencies and their profes-
sional managers are as battered as anyone else by the political
winds. Third, and most important, scientists who want the freedom
to pursue their experiments without interference are not asking to
be treated in the manner of air and water and working conditions, to
be regulated by a quasi-independent expert agency subject to judi-
cial review. They are asking instead to be left alone. They do not
want to be regulated by experts; they prefer not to be regulated at
all. They view their work as comparable to the decisions of the
press on what to print and the decisions of private citizens on
whether to marry and when to change jobs. They seek a restoration
of the brief-lived scientific immunity mentioned in the introduction;
they are asking, in short, that the practice of science be created a
12. 33 U.S.c. § 1314 (1982) (water pollution); 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982) (air quality
criteria and control techniques).
13. The federal courts generally take a strongly defercntial stance in rcviewing scien-
tific findings of Congress and of the expert agencies it has created to administer its
regulatory schemes. See. e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519,557-58 (1978) (courts may not impose procedural restrictions beyond those cre-
ated by Congress); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189. 1259 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (conflicts in scientific cvidence must be rcsolved in favor of the expert agency's
interpretation); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA. 541 F.2d I. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976). arl. dm/ed. 426 U.S.
941 (1976) (court may not substitule its own scientific understanding fOl' that of the
expert agency).
14. See Carter. supm note 7. at 1339-41.
15. For a somewhat depressing analysis of just how far from independenn' an
agency can move, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
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fundamental righl. Thus redefined, the debate becomes more
complex.
What scientists want, really, is to be left free to experiment,
guided only by the demands of science and of their own con-
sciences, restricted in their freedom for only the most pressing rea-
sons of public safety. It; If they .succeed in this push, they will have
marked themselves as special and their endeavor as quite different
from other tasks undertaken in a society in whi~h nearly everyone is
regulated. In the post-war era, those seeking to be marked as spe-
cial in this way, to be left free of burdensome restrictions, have usu-
ally chosen one of three <l:pproaches. The most obvious strategy is
one of lobbying, of pushing for legislative or perhaps administrative
protection (or exemption) for the chosen activity. With a Washing-
ton bureaucracy involved so heavily in so many areas of life, this is a
perfectly sensible and generally cost-effective strategy. It may not
work, however, and when lobbying fails, two additional strategies
are available to those seeking to mark their work as special: First,
they may follow the advice of lawyers and litigate until a court de-
crees that the Constitution gives them the right to do what they want
to do. Second, they may try to attract sufficient resources to obtain
the freedom to continue their experiments through private agree-
ments, and, if unable to do so, return to the legislature, this time
pressing a claim for relief from a market failure. Other strategies
are rarely tried, because if the legislative struggle results in defeat,
and if neither the Constitution (as read by the courts) nor the mar-
ket (as reflected in ability to attract resources) considers the activity
special, then in a regulated society, perhaps it isn'l.
The debate over scientific freedom does not arise unless the legis-
lative battle is lost and scientists are threatened with unwanted regu-
lation - regulation which either chooses a different map or
construes the agreed map differently than scientific researchers
would prefer. Thus, I will focus initially on these last two strategies,
to try to determine the likelihood that scientists can succeed either
in litigating for a fundamental right or buying out those in a position
to halt or restrict their research. Subsequently, I will attempt to
sketch the ways in which scientists seeking the freedom to experi-
ment might instead pursue a more traditional but nowadays less
popular strategy for gaining what they wanl. In none of this should
16. See. e.g.. Baltimore. Limiting Science: A Biologist's Perspective. in LIMtTS OF SCIEN-
TIFIC INQ.UIRY 37 (G. Holton & R. Morison cds. 1979); Piel. Inquiring Into Inquiry': Two
Opposing l'iews. 6 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT. August 1976. at 18-19.
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I be understood as urging that legislatures should reject the claims of
researchers to autonomy; I mean only to evaluate the meaning of
this rejection and to recommend courses the scientific community
might consider in overcoming its likely defeat.
III. Two Strategies for Imposing the Map
A. The Allure of Constitutionalism
Plainly, legislative or administrative bodies will sometimes differ
with scientists on the proper map to choose and will consequently
adopt regulations limiting experimentation in some fashion or
other. The literature on scientific policy-making has prepared for
this eventuality with a common prescription: Scientists and their al-
lies, when they lose in the political processes, should do what every-
one else who loses in the political process seeks to do. They should
cloak themselves and their activities in a claim of "right" tailored
from constitutional cloth. Put simply, they should go to court.
As our constitutional democracy has matured, the courts have
been the weapon of choice for many who want to impose their own
putatively rational map in place of the presumptively blank map
chosen by the mob. With the courts well-established in the business
of "discovering" fundamental rights in various constitutional provi-
sions,17 the probability of success must seem sufficiently high to
make litigation an attractive option. So when the political process
makes a bad decision - and almost every decision is bad by someone S
standards - the remedy is quite frequently a lawsuit claiming that
some constitutional right has been violated.
In this tradition, sympathetic legal scholars have come to the aid
of the scientific community. Concerned by the contention in the sci-
entific community that public fears will lead ultimately to suppres-
sion of research, these scholars have gone to considerable length to
explain why some part of the Constitution - usually the First
Amendment - extends protection to something that is called the
"right to inquire" or the "right to experiment."IB Although the
precise formulation of this right varies somewhat from one writer to
the next, this exposition is characteristic:
17. For some critiques of this search for fundamental righls, see, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Brest, The Fundamelltal Rights Controversy: The Essential Contra-
dictions of Nonnative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Cowtitutional Pro-
tection for ScientiJic Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978); Ferguson, ScielltiJic Inquiry and the
First Amelldment, 64 CORN. L. REV. 639 (1979); Robertson, The Scientists Right to Research:
A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1978). See also, infra note 21.
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[T]he first amendment does in fact protect the gathering of informa-
tion, but ... the information-gathering process may permissibly be
regulated when such regulation is necessary to further an important
state interest. ...
. . . Scientists would assert only the right to gather information to
test their hypotheses free from governmental restrictions based on the
nature of the theory. It seems clear that the first amendment protects
this rig·ht. 1!1
Now, in the first place, this claim is not quite to the point. Rarely will
the government seek to impose a restriction "based on the nature of
the theory." Few would defend a government regulation stating
"There shall be no research regarding Theory X because we hate
Theory X. "20 The regulation will always result from a perception of
risk, and will be aimed at the experiments, not the theory. The only
relevant right that scientific researchers would need or want is the
right to pursue their experiments - their knowledge-gathering -
without regard to any irrational or uninformed perceptions of risk,
and perhaps without regard to any concerns over the morality of the
research or knowledge to be gained. It is this form of the right
which the literature has generally sought to defend. Thus for the
purpose of this discussion, it is sensible to treat as one the right to
inquire and the right to experiment, even though as a semantical
proposition they are arguably distinct. 21 Although the conclusion
that the right "exists" has been reached via several different routes,
most of them seem to flow from a central theory. The argument
generally runs something like this:
(I) Scientific speech (as opposed to scientific experiment) is entitled
to a heavy degree of First Amendment protection.
(2) If a form of speech is protected, then that which is a necessary
prerequisite to it is protected.
(3) Scientific experiment is a necessary prerequisite to scientific
speech, since without the testing of hypotheses, a scientist is engaging
in no more than semi-informed speculation, which is not the same as
scientific speech. In other words, without scientific experiment, scien-
tific speech is not possible. .
19. Delgado & Millen, supra note 18. at 377.
20. Perhaps the only exception involves religiously motivated hostility to the theory
of evolution as a theory. but the Establishment Clause has proved quite adequate to
support challenges to anti-evolution statutes. without the need to resort to a more com-
plex argument on the right to do science. See. e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
21. Were a logical distinction to be drawn. one might propose that the right to ill-
quire would include the seeking of knowledge by means not involving interaction with
the physical world, whereas the right to experiment would include those interactions. I
emphasize that despite disclaimers, the literature clearly seeks to defend the second.
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(-1) Therefore, scientific experiment is protected.~~
Some forms of the argument substitute other premises for those
presented here, but in each case, the argument reduces to some-
thing similar to that set out above.~:l Taking for the moment a legal-
theoretic approach - conceding, in other words, that the Constitu-
tion is at least an appropriate battleground - I will consider each
premise in its turn.
1. The Fi,'sl Premise
The initial premise, that scientific speech is entitled to a heavy
degree of First Amendment protection, is usually supported either
by historical exposition or through an appeal to the fundamental
purposes of the Amendment. The preeminent work of historical ex-
position is probably the careful study of the views of the Framers
presented by Steven Goldberg in support of his thesis that "the
Constitution contains an implied science clause," to wit, "Congress
may legislate the establishment of science, but shall not prohibit the
free exercise of scientific speech. "24 Professor Goldberg asserts that
the history reveals an "intimate relation between science and civil
liberty" in the minds of American political theorists of the late eight-
eenth century.25 Other writers move from the history to the asser-
tion that freedom of scientific speech supports "individual self-
fulfillment" and "attainment of truth"2G - goals that some would
place near the heart of the First Amendment's purposes.27
. These theoretical arguments may be met in the first place with the
response that not everyone takes so expansive a view on the nature
22. See, e.g., Ferguson, supm note 18, at 611-54. None of the academic writers claims
that this freedom is absolute or, in particular, that it can withstand compelling concerns
over public safety.
23. Robertson, for example, considers basing a right to research on rights of privacy
and association before settling on the First Amendment's protections of spet·ch. Rob-
ertson, supra note 18, at 1212- i 5. Delgado and Millen spend several pages discussing
ways of knowing and selling forth the constitutional protections for each, but their anal-
ysis still reduces to the proposition that inquiry, if protected at all, must be protected
becausc of what it adds to the ability to engage in other protected activity. Delgado &
Millen, supra note 18, at 372-88.
24. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. I, I.
25. !d. at 6-7. See also Delgado & Millen, supra note 18, at 354-61. One of tht·
problems for the historical argument, even assuming its formal validity, is that outside of
the Patent Clause (and perhaps the Establishment Clause), there is little if anything in
the Constitution or in the debates over its ratification to suggest that scientifir fr"l'cdom
was a significant concern. Thus both Goldbel'g and Delgado and Millen rely hl'avily on
the private views of the Framers and the published views of various non-American pOlil-
ical philosophers.
26. See, e.g., Delgado & Millen, supm note 18. at 364-65.
27. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Bakel',
Scope of Fint Amendmmt Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978).
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of the First Amendment's protections. The leading exponent of
what might be called the "narrow scope" school is Robert Bork,
who has expressed the following view:
I agree that there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior
and the publication of a novel like Ulysses, for the latter may form atti-
tudes that ultimately affect politics. But it is an analogy, not an iden-
tity. Other human activities and experiences also form personality,
teach and create attitudes just as much as does the novel, but no one
would on that account, I take it, suggest that the first amendment
strikes down regulations of economic activity, control of entry into a
trade, laws about sexual behavior, marriage, and the like. Yet these
activities, in their capacity to create attitudes that ultimately impinge
upon the political process, are more like literature and science than
literature and science are like political speech. If the dialectical pro-
gression is not to become an analogical stampede, the protection of
the first amendment must be cut off when it reaches the outer limits of
political speech.28
The existence of a contrary opinion - especially one which, like this
one, states a decidedly minority position - hardly makes the propo-
nents of the right to inquiry wrong. But it is not easy to see how
logic alone will dictate the choice among competing formulations of
First Amendment right. One may earnestly believe that the First
Amendment protects whatever is necessary for individual self-fulfill-
ment or attainment of truth, but the belief does not make it so, and
the Supreme Court has avoided adopting so broad a definition. On
the other hand, while one may claim that any attempt to extend First
Amendment protection beyond political speech invites slippery
slope problems, the difficulty of drawing lines only illuminates the
practical problems of implementing a proposal. That difficulty does
not necessarily show the proposal to be unwise, and hardly shows it
to be wrong. The great majority of First Amendment scholars would
protect much more than the political speech that some see as the
Amendment's core.29 The courts, moreover, have certainly pressed
the limits of First Amendment protection well beyond Judge Bork's
relatively narrow conception of free speech.30
Because proponents of free scientific inquiry frame their essen-
tially normative proposals as though already supported in positive
law, it is useful to look at the cases. But a problem arises immedi-
28. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1,27 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624 (1980).
30. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981) (entertainment).
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ately: There are no decisions holding that scientific speech is cov-
ered by the First Amendment. Some have so suggested in dicta,31
but no court has ever been explicit. The strongest support might
co'me from those cases involving statutes restricting the teaching of
evolution, but the courts have always been careful to decide them on
the alternative ground of improper religious motivation.32 In fact,
in United States v. Progressive, Inc.,33 the one case in which the ques-
tion was squarely presented, the trial court approved a prior restraint
on publication of scientific information. The significance of the de-
cision lies in the fact that in virtually every other case involving a
prior restraint on a protected form of expression, the restraint was
ultimately struck down.34 The entire flavor of the trial court's opin-
ion in the Progressive case evinces a concern that scientific informa-
tion (at least some scientific information) may be qualitatively
different from information of other types because of the greater
danger it potentially poses. 35 Certainly the reasoning of the court's
opinion may be challenged, and the decision does not explicitly re-
fute the contention that scientific speech enjoys full First Amend-
ment protection, but the decision surely does raise questions for the
advocates of that view.
Advocates of freedom for scientific speech should remember that
the courts have identified many forms of communication which are
not entitled to the full protections of the First Amendment. Thus
obscenity, commercial speech, and libel,' to take but a handful of
examples, are all speech in some sense but are not - so the courts
31. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965) (freedom of inquiry);
Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 67 (N.D. Ind. 1969) (right of scholars to do research).
32. For example, both Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), and McLean v.
Arkansas Bd. of Edue., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), were decided on the ground
that the law in question violated the Establishment Clause.
33. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O. Wise. 1979), reconsideration denied, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.O.
Wisc. 1979), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
34. Direct comparison is probably unfair, because the Progressive case was dismissed
as moot before final appeal of the injunction was possible. It is conceivable - indeed, it
seems fairly probable - that the government would have lost in the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court. But speculation of this kind is less impressive than is the fact that a
federal district judge, faced with the wealth of precedent disdaining prior restraints (see,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), was nevertheless convinced that on the facts before
him, he was justified in restraining publication of an article purporting to explain how a
hydrogen bomb might be constructed.
35. For example, the court's first opinion stated: "[T]his Court can find no plausible
reason why the public needs to know the technical details about hydrogen bomb con-
struction to carryon an informed debate on this issue." 467 F. Supp. at 994. Earlier
prior restraint cases did not seek to analyze the relative contribution of the information
in question to public debate, and indeed, substantive analysis of content flies in the face
of traditional First Amendment review.
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say - speech of the kind that the First Amendment most centrally
protects.:I !' And as long as a thing can be speech and yet not be the
su~ject of full First Amendment protection, it falls to the advocate
to explain why speech of the sort under discussion is possessed of
those qualities the First Amendment most values - or is not pos-
sessed of those qualities it disdains. "Treat science like obscenity"
may yet become the rallying cry of those who seek to limit the free-
dom to experiment, and the defenders of unfettered research must
be prepared with counter-arguments. 37
This should not be taken as an anti-free-speech polemic. It is in-
tended to show that even the first premise is hot without contro-
versy, that waving the twin banners of "speech" and "First
Amendment" is not enough to resolve even this preliminary matter.
Perhaps those who propose a freedom to exchange scientific infor-
mation would do better to follow Steven Goldberg's argument and
look at the understanding of the Framers. True, there are some
problems with his analysis; in particular, the fact that many of the
Framers considered scientific thought important does not mean that
any protection for it was written into the Constitution. Further, and
perhaps more important, a growing number of modern constitu-
tional theorists challenge the interpretive approach giving disposi-
tive weight to the views of the Framers - even assuming that those
views can be ascertained, which, consensus holds, they quite often
cannot. 311 But there is a sense in which this scholarly consensus
scarcely matters. Even if scholars reject too great a reliance on the
Constitution's legislative history, the courts continue to wallow in
the murky waters of the Framers' intentions. And after all, when
one writes an essay contending that the First Amendment "does"
protect scientific speech,3!) it is the courts one is trying to convince.
It may be that proponents of freedom of scientific speech would
do best to abandon a claim that scientific speech is a special category
and to argue instead that the general speech of all sorts that is pro-
36. See. e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (libel); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (tig-hting words).
37. This slog-an is a jocular suggestion of my colleage Owen Fiss.
38. Although few scholars are likely to agree with every point made therein, perhaps
the most articulate summary of the weaknesses in the "oI'iginal intention" approach is
Brest, The .\Iisronreived Ques/ fOl' the Original enders/anding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
39. I myself doubt whether the relatively indeterminate constiwtionallanguage pro-
tecting individual rights - the language, for example, of the First Amendment - can
birly he said to possess any "inherent" meaning. See Carter, COIlS/i/u/ional At{judira/ion
find /hl' Indl'/nmina/e Tex/: A Preliminary De/emf of an Impl'lfer/ .\fuddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821
(I !lH5).
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tee ted by the First Amendment does not lose that protection merely
because it happens to include some scientific data or argument. The
proponents of the right would thus face the potentially insurmount-
able obstacle which they have sought to avoid: The traditional First
Amendment distinction between speech and conduct.-lO The entire
point of the advocates of a special right to do science is to protect
more than the flow of data. So this softer form of the right, while
probably easier to defend, is not one that could possibly satisfy
many of those who contend that the Constitution should be read to
protect a right to inquire.
2. The Second Premise
A teacher of mine once asserted that every constitutional argu-
ment in part involves a leap of faith, and the argument for protec-
tion of scientific inquiry only confirms his insight. The leap here is in
the premise that when a form of speech is protected, then that which
is its necessary prerequisite is also protected.· One of the judges on
the District of Columbia Circuit is fond of inquiring innocently at
oral argument: "What is your 'single best case for that proposition,
Counselor?" Were the proponents of the constitutional right to ex-
periment pressed to answer that question with respect to this sec-
ond premise, they would likely hem and haw and finally mention
Houchins v. KQED41 and its close relatives,4:.! or Buckley v. Valeo.43
The purpose of the citation to Houchins would be to show that
there exists a "newsgathering privilege" by necessary implication
from the First Amendment's protection for freedom of the press.44
That is hardly a novel proposition and is possibly an appealing
one""" The only problem is that Houchins was decided the other way
- against the claims of the press - and the references there and in
other cases to a possible privilege to gather news exist only as dicta.
As a consequence, even if one believes that the Supreme Court is
40. See. e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a draft card is
conduct, not speech); Tinker v. Des Moine~ School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wear-
ing an armband in school is speech. not conduct). '
41. 438 U.S. I (1978). Houchins rejected the claim of special journalistic right ofaccess
different from the access of the general public. but suggested that there might exist a
special right to gather nt.'ws. See id. at 14-15.
42. Among the cases containing relevant dicta are Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665
(1972), and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Both cases were decided on in-
dependent grounds.
43. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
44. See, e.g., Ferguson. supra note 18, at 652-53; Robertson, supra note 18, at 1226-
40.
45. For early efforts at formalizing this privilege. see, e.g.. Note, The Rights of Ihe Public
and Ihe Press to Galher In/onnalioll, 87 HAR\". L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Righi of Ihe
Pms 1o Gather Illformalioll. 71 COLUM. L. RE\". 838 (1971).
373
HeinOnline -- 3 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 374 1984-1985
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 3:358, 1985
inclined to grant such a privilege. there is no way to tell in advance
anything about its scope or its depth.
Yet matters of definition are important: It is necessary to know to
what the scientific freedom analogy is drawn. Certainly not every-
thing a reporter might do as a prerequisite to protected speech is
protected. For example, the First Amendment undoubtedly pro-
tects the right of a newspaper to publish the minutes of a secret
White House meeting at which sabotage of political opponents is
discussed. But would the Amendment save from prosecution a re-
porter who was arrested breaking into the Oval Office to look for
those minutes? Quite clearly it would not.
More to the point, anyone can define a form of speech, argue for
its full protection, and then set forth its prerequisites. That does
not mean the prerequisites are protected. To take just one more
example, I might define something called "The Right to Shout
Political Slogans." I could point to many situations in which this
right has been protected, including any number of protest demon-
strations and political rallies. Having thereby established that the
Right to Shout Political Slogans is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion, I would then contend that one cannot really Shout Political
Slogans without the aid of amplifying equipment. (Here someone
might argue that I could use my own unaided lung power, but that is
a typical lay person's error. All professional Shouters understand
that real Shouting of Political Slogans is done with amplifying
equipment - otherwise it is mere shouting.) The conclusion to be
drawn, naturally, is that the Right to Shout Political Slogans includes
the right to use amplifying equipment, and that as a consequence,
the First Amendment protects my right to use it. The only trouble is
that this claim has already been rejected by the Supreme Court:
There may be a Right to Shout Political Slogans, but there is no
fundamental right to use amplifying equipment.4li
In other words, it is not altogether a sensible argument that
newsgathering is protected merely because news reporting is. I do
not mean to suggest, however, that the press enjoys no rights differ-
ent from those of the public at large. Yet such special and distinc-
tive rights as the press may possess surely flow from whatever
qualities the free press clause adds to the free speech clause.47 The
46. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 u.s. 77 (1949). Advocates of the right to experiment
might simply reply that Kovacs was wrongly decided, but surely an analyst claiming to
set forth what the law "is" cannot be permitted so easy an out.
47. Cf Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of
Speech? 26 HASTINGS L. J. 639 (1975).
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right to do some things in furtherance of the gathering of news is not
,a right to do all things in furtherance of the gathering of news.
The same principle applies a fortiori to the conduct of scientific
experiments, which is not even supported by any special constitu-
tional clause of its own. If the newsgathering right is so tenuous,
and definition of a form of protected speech and its underlying ne-
cessity so easy, those calling for a right to do scientific experiments
must offer more than the syllogistic argument they advance in sup-
port of their claim that necessary prerequisites to constitutional
speech are also protected.
Buckley v. Valeo also stands for an altogether different proposition
than the one the second premise asserts. There the Court (among
other things) struck down on First Amendment grounds a congres-
sional restriction on the amount an individual could spend, in-
dependent of direct contributions, in behalf of a "clearly identified"
candidate for public office.48 As described by advocates of a consti-
tutional right to inquire, Buckley rested on the premise that the
spending of money was a prerequisite to political speech.49 The
Justices certainly used that language,50 but calling the phrase an im-
portant premise does not seem to be the most sensible reading of
the Court's opinion. The main point cannot be that expenditure of
money is absolutely protected when it leads to protected speech, or
all contribution limits would be unconstitutionaJ.5t The distinction
must be between Anna giving a dollar to Bob for Bob to purchase
advertising and Anna purchasing the advertising herself. When
Anna herself purchases the time, she is exercising creative control of
some sort; in other words, she herself is speaking. When Anna
speaks, she has the right to decide the form her expression will take,
and the expenditure of money is thus a part of, rather than a prereq-
uisite to, her speech. But when Anna instead contributes money to
Bob, he will make the ultimate choice about how it is spent. Anna
herself is making no choice about the form of her expression; she is
not expressing herself at all, and thus is not speaking.
If this is the proper distinction - and I confess that explaining
Buckley is not an easy task - then Judge J. Skelly Wright, who later
wrote an article on the decision, correctly understood it when he
argued that the Justices were holding that the expenditure of money







Buckll')', 424 U.S. at 5 I.
See F~rguson, supra note 18, at 652.
424 U.S. at 19.
Most of the limits in question were sustained. See id. at 23-38.
See Wright, Politics and the C01lStitution: Is .\/on(')· SpeecH, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
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have argued elsewhere that it is a bad one5~ - but it is at bottom the
only explanation that makes sense. Viewed from this perspective,
Buckle)' has nothing to do with protecting what is required in order
to engage in some constitutionally protected activity. Its rule in-
stead covers an activity - the purchase of advertising for independ-
ent support of a candidate - that is itself protected. The
expenditure is not protected because it will lead to speech; it is pro-
tected because, in the judgment of the Court, the expenditure is
speech.
Thus to rely on Buckley - even granting the proposition that the
case is rightly decided - the supporter of free scientific inquiry is
forced to make by far the more difficult argument, that scientific re-
search is speech. This contention would naturally run up against the
speech/conduct distinction I have mentioned before; it is in any
event a position that seems counter-intuitive, and, perhaps as a con-
sequence, is difficult to support.
My purpose here is not to assert that no prerequisites to pro-
tected speech can themselves be entitled to constitutional protec-
tion; rather, I am arguing that an independent rationale' for
protection must be offered. The simple existence of a connection
between a protected activity and a second one the status of which is
unclear is not enough to show that the second is also protected.
3. The Third Premise
The argument for constitutional protection for scientific inquiry
proceeds from its scientific speech premise to the assertion that sci-
entific inquiry is a "prerequisite" to scientific speech. Although it is
tempting to accept this contention as relatively non-controversial,
this may not be so easy. In the first place, it is wrong to assume that
there is one set of procedures (hypothesis-experiment-observation-
hypothesis) that is "the" scientific method and that therefore em-
bodies science. This is not the place to consider in detail competing
philosophies of science.54 Suffice it to say that one may observe and
speculate on the nature of the physical universe without also per-
forming experiments to determine whether one's views are correct.
"But wait," the alert reader might say, "you are describing not sci-
ence, but mere guesswork." If the alert reader is correct, then most
of today's cosmologists and many of yesterday's physicists and bi-
53. See Caner. Technology and Democracy, supra note II, at 590, 605.
54. In a forthcoming work, I do consider whether these competing philosophies
might carry differing implications for constitutional adjudication. See Carter. Some Con-
stitutional Implications of Scientific Irrationality 42-45 (unpublished work-in-progress)
Ihereinafter cited as Carter. Constitutional Implicationsl.
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ologists cannot properly be called scientists. If that seems an ac-
ceptable result, one ought also to consider that if humanity survives
the next few centuries, the scientists of that future era will no doubt
look back on our puny efforts and scoff, "That ~as not really science
that they were doing, because they lacked our modern methods for
experiment" - and in another five or six hundred years, their inheri-
tors will look back and say much the same thing.
This point is not as picky as it may seem. What qualifies as science
and what constitutes a scientific experiment are often in the eye of
the beholder, and condemning a self-proclaimed scientist for not
doing what others define as "science" is in the end a hopeless ef-
fort. 55 Thus to say that scientific experiment is a prerequisite to sci-
entific speech is to say little or nothing unless the expositor and the
auditor of the argument can first agree on what they are talking
about. If the expositor says that this is the way things are because
most scientists agree that this is the way things are, and also reserves
the right to define which people are "scientists" and thus entitled to
a vote, then the argument is growing circular, and further pursuit of
the issue is probably pointless.
4. The Status of the Right
This argument has been an effort to meet the theorists on their
own ground, to explain why the existence of a right of scientific in-
quiry is not so clear as the literature sometimes makes it appear.
This does not mean that judicial creation of a right of this sort
would be a bad thing; on the contrary, a properly delimited right to
scientific inquiry, for all the normative reasons advanced by its pro-
ponents, might well prove a boon to our development as a just and
healthy society.
But the right to inquire freely should be approached as cautiously
as any other proposal to place some decisions affecting large num-
bers of people beyond the reach of traditional political processes.
In this sense, the proposition that scientists should be left alone is
what 1 have described elsewhere as a "Separatist" idea, because the
scientists and their allies are trying to make an end-run around pub-
lic opinion, which is often cheaper than trying to change people's
minds. 56 Over the years, a good number of these end-runs, espe-
55. For a discussion of some of the intricacies in attempting definitions of this kind.
see J. ZIMAN. PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF
SCIENCE 1-29 (1968).
56. Set' CarIer. Sepamtism alld Skepticism, supra note 7. The term "Separatis'" is not nl\"
own invention; I borrow it from Joel Yellin. See Yellin. Scifllce, Ted/1/olog)'. and .1dministm-
tive GOI'f/'1I111f11t: Illstitutional Desig7ls fo1' Ellvimllmf1ltal Decisiollmaking. 92 YALE LJ, 1300.
1307 pmsim (1983).
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cially many of those proclaiming constitional rights, have made posi-
tive contributions to the society. Not all of them, however, can be
said to do so.
The federal courts, it has often been emphasized, play an educa-
tional role. In their continuing dialogue with the public, the courts
force the nation to face the decisions that it has made, sometimes
through action, sometimes through inaction. 57 This most recent de-
cision of yours, the courts may say, is contrary to the moral precepts
embodied in the Constitution by which you have chosen to claim that
you run your society. So make your choice: Change your decision
or eliminate the precept.5 1! But don't continue your pretense. Even
the Court's most controversial decisions, such cases as Lochner v.
New York 59 and Roe v. Wade,GO may be said to serve a function of this
kind.
The difficulty with the proposed right to scientific inquiry (as with
so many other contemporary claims of right) is that it is not easily
twisted to fit this framework. For most Americans, science is some-
thing beyond understanding and often quite intimidating - occa-
sionally even frightening. Assume for the moment that the federal
courts ultimately hold that the Constitution indeed protects some
right to inquire. This right may not fit well with the notion that
courts perform an educational function. The public would likely re-
sist the suggestion that there exist moral precepts, long accepted by
the society, that have to do with freedom to inquire. Should a court
nevertheless insist on a fundamental right to perform scientific ex-
periments, those who heap abuse on the courts for losing touch with
the country will heap more abuse.
There are those who will respond, "So what? When the courts do
justice, somebody is always upset." But that objection, while true, is
also not quite to the point: The fact that someone is upset is no
proof that justice has been done. What matters is not whether the
losers are upset, but what the winners choose to do about it. It
seems a bit tacky, not to say reactionary, to assert in these enlight-
ened times that not all things that are good must be enshrined in the
Constitution. But a judicial decision announcing a new right is less
a victory in a war than a triumph in a single battle. What happens
57. Cf A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT III (1975); WellinglOn, Common Law
Rules and Constilutional Double Standards: Some l\'otes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221
(1973); Caner, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constilutional
Decisions (unpublished work-in-progress).
58. For those who find the texl a bit obscure, let me say that by "eliminate the pre-
cept" I mean only "amend the Constitution."
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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later also matters. If the winners - here, the supporters of the right
,tID :inquiry - dismiss the losers as so many disgruntled and unedu-
,cated fanatics, then they will in effect be saying, "We have the votes
'on lhe Court, so leave us alone." If that is the best justification that
tOne winners can offer the public, then in the long run, there is an
excellent chance that the hard-won victory will be overturned in the
first of many defeats. A successful end-run around public opposition
should be only the start, not the end, of the campaign, and this prin-
cipk applies whether the issue is desegregation, the death penalty,
or scientific inquiry. This point I will consider in somewhat greater
detail after a brief detour along another course that scientific re-
searchers might elect if the judicial strategy, like the legislative one,
proves a failure.
B. The Potential Failure of the Market
Despite their defeat in constitutional argument, supporters of un-
fettered scientific inquiry might have another approach to recom-
mend: Structure any regulations in the form of entitlements running
in favor of identifiable individuals or institutions. Then, if the sci-
entific research is in fact socially useful, the scientists might buy
their way to freedom to experiment by purchasing whatever con-
trary entitlements the legislature might create. This strategy could
not circumvent an outright ban on the research. If, however, the
restriction were in the form of an entitlement of someone to be free
of the research, or if the opposition could be bribed to end its pres-
sure prior to any legislative action, then a series of private transac-
tions might permit the work to go forward. In other words,
following Coase, the result of any regulation ought to depend on
the cost of transacting around it.51 If left to bargain among them-
selves, the parties should reach an efficient result; if the law imposes
a different rule, they will try to work around it. Thus in the case of
objectionable research, as long as the transaction costs are low, any
rule short 9f outright ban ought not to matter.62
For example, the entitlement not to have research performed (or
61. See Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3J. LAw & ECON. I (1960). This proposition.
sometimes called the Coase Theorem, is richer than my inadequate textual statement
implies. It may be worth noting, however, that the Coase Theorem does make certain
empirical assumptions about human behavior - assumptions that may test out only be-
cause of popular inculcation with a market ideology. See Kelman, Spit:J'r alld Hoffillall all
Coase: A Brief RejoilUuT, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. ) 215, )215 (1980): Kelman, COllSU1IIptioll Theory'.
Productioll Theory. alld Ideology ill the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 678 (1979).
62. A ban could not practically be circumvented because there would be no entitle-
ments to purchase. In Coasean terms, an entitlement is a freely alienable privilege to do
something or to remain free of it. The privilege is initially assigned to an individual or
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to have it performed only in a particular way) might be protected by
a property rule running in favor of a museum fearing that its busi-
ness will be affected by the research program that a neighboring
university plans to undertake.ti3 If transaction costs are low, then
the university can pay its neighbor, which perceives itself as being at
risk, to waive its rights. The calculus would be trivial: If proceeding
with the research is worth $50,000 to the university, then a risk-neu-
tral museum with one chance in 100 of suffering $100,000 worth of
harm, would get something between $10,000 and $50,000 to shut
up and go away. If the university researchers could not afford the
purchase price, that might say something about the social utility of
their work, at least if one believes, as neoclassical economists do,
that resources will generally find their way into the hands of those
able to give them their most socially useful application.64 If the re-
searchers could afford the $10,000 to $50,000, then the experiment
would be able to proceed.65
That would be fun if it worked, but it probably would not work
anywhere except on paper. In the first place, the example may be
group but may be transferred to another. If a practice is entirely forbidden, the privi-
lege is not alienable.
63. One may imagine instead that the museum is protected by a liability rule requir-
ing the university to pay any damages. If the museum is perfectly risk neutral, it would
not then care whether the research took place. The museum is not likely to be risk
neutral, however, and in any event might choose to disbelieve official assurances that it
would be compensated for all damages, especially if the damages it expects in the event
of accident would be catastrophic. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 V.S. 59 (1979) (sustaining constitutionality of Price-Anderson Act,
which limits nuclear power industry's liability in the event of a nuclear accident).
One student of these problems has argued that private negligence actions should play
a much larger role than they currently do in the regulation of scientific research. See
Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 V. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1403
(1983). For a statement of quite the opposite view, see Murray, Law and Research Sup-
ported by Government, in LAw AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 16, 24 (H. Jones ed. 1966)
(government should indemnify government-sponsored scientific researchers "against
the risk of liability for catastrophic accidents").
64. This analysis is not quite accurate when basic scientific research is viewed as
producing a public good - knowledge - which once made available may be appropri-
ated by the next user at a marginal cost close to zero. See D. GREENBERG, THE POLITICS
OF PURE SCIENCE 26-27 (1967) (contrasting costs and benefits of basic and applied sci-
ence). In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, however, as is the case with much
controversial research, the research was applied, not basic - the question was whether
the recombinant DNA bacteria could make potato plants more frost-tolerant - and thus
might have attracted private investment. See 587 F. Supp. at 755-56. The private invest-
ment would of course be attracted only because the government has already intervened
through the creation of a patent system.
65. Bear in mind that in the example I am assuming a legislature which, under public
pressure, has declined to impose an efficient solution, and am further assuming that
because of the legislative intervention, judicial selection of an efficient rule is impossible
unless the rule can be dressed as a constitutional right. I will momentarily consider
whether the legislature ought after all to impose an efficient solution.
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unreasonable in its assumption that some of the usual causes of high
transaction costs are not present - that the scientific researchers
can join together at low cost for the bargaining, and that the same is
true of those who might object.GG Even if the relevant parties can
indeed join together at low cost to bargain, there is a second, mOre
important problem likely to lead to market failure: The public's un-
certainty, its mistrust of scientists, and its fear of the experiments
may be so great that the public's "asking price" for the waiver would
be astronomical. The museum might in all sincerity demand $1 mil-
lion, and no amount of argument by the scientists might convince
the museum of its analytical error.G7 The museum might demand
that its property be purchased entirely and that the scientists reset-
tle its collection elsewhere. It might demand that the experiments
be performed on a remote desert island, and that the museum still
be compensated in advance for its risk.
If the museum's directors had access to (and were prepared to
believe) all relevant information, their decision on rational self-in-
terest might of course be quite different. But much of the relevant
information is inaccessible because it is too technical; in this sense,
the information cost is too high. The scientists might be able to
explain it, except that the museum's directors may prefer what
seems to them a less costly alternative, such as trusting the explana-
tions they glean from the pages of popular magazines. They may
prefer to trust their own instincts and fears, whether rational or not.
They may prefer to trust ill-informed politicians or journalists.
They may prefer to trust dissenters from the scientific consensus.
Lack of trust may not be the only cause of high information costs.
In many situations, particularly those raising the biohazard fears,
not all the information needed to make reasonably accurate predic-
tions is available even to scientists, so the risks may not be fully
quantifiable.G!i If everything were known, experimentation would be
unnecessary, Perhaps more to the point, the public may assess risks
and (particularly) benefits differently than the scientific community
66. For reasons that are obscure, some critics have wrongly accused Professor Coase
of ignoring the problem of transaction costs. Not only did he not ignore the problem in
his original article (indeed, they were the point of the original article), but he has re-
cently emphasized that the time has passed when scholarly debate should concentrate on
examples in which transaction costs are relatively low. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the
Emp/.v Core:.-I Comment, 24]. LAw & ECON. 183 (1981).
67. I am assuming that the counter-demand is based on the museum's actual. if per-
haps erroneous, cost-benefit determination, and is not strategic in nature.
68. Su, e.g., B. FISCHOFf, S. LICHTENSTEIN, P. SLOVIC, S. DERBY & R. KEENEY, Ac-
CEPTABLE RISK 61-78 (1981); Green, The Risk-BfIlejit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43
GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 791 (1975).
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would. Most controversial experiments or processes will involve
some degree of risk, albeit a minuscule one. The public may not per-
ceive as benefits the results the scientists predict. So while the pub-
lic's fears may often be disproportionate to the likelihood of harm, it·
can rarely be said that they are wholly irrational. To take a single
ubiquitous example, while it is true that the disaster at Three Mile
Island never presented a danger of nuclear explosion (a commonly
mentioned public fear about nuclear power), the containment did
come close to a conventional explosion that would have scattered ra-
dioactive material over a considerable distance,69 and the core tem-
perature was nearly high enough to cause meltdown. 70 Like other
aspects of the accident, these problems apparently were not as-
signed a very high probability when the experts modeled the risks of
nuclear power generation.71 Although generalizing from a single
example is hardly fair, it does seem safe to say that not even the
scientists who want to perform the experiments will always fully ap-
preciate the risks.
This example points up an additional problem: Many of the ex-
periments to which the public most objects are on or near the fron-
tiers of knowledge and thus, implicitly, the frontiers of ethics and
morality. The moral judgment of the public may differ drastically
from the scientific credo that there is no bad knowledge, only bad
use of knowledge. The President's Commission may conclude that
it is far too soon to begin considering questions regarding transfer-
ring genetic material between animals and humans,72 but science
twists along funny paths (an argument scientists generally use
against regulation) and the technology may arrive tomorrow. Public
fears are generated by concern over what could happen - and sci-
ence is unable as a formal matter to assign a zero probability to any
event. Nor would it be sensible to do so with respect to the public's
greatest fears: If every aspect of the recombinant DNA organism
that a researcher wishes to release into the atmosphere were under-
stood, there would be no need for the experiment. In the public's
view, the fact that the experiment is thought necessary may itself
become cause for alarm.
69. See 1 STAFF REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE
MILE ISL'\ND 61-78 (1979).
70. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8.1984, at A13, col. 1.
71. See Yellin, High Technology, supra note 7, at 516-28, 528 n. 235 (suggesting that
TMI accident casts doubts on all weights assigned in NRC's risk assessment model).
72. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE 79-83 (1982).
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These twin problems of inaccessible and unknown information
would likely combine to cause a market failure so severe that effec-
tive private bargaining would not be possible. When high costs pre-
vent bargaining, reform may take one of two courses: Altering the
substantive rule or altering those conditions of the parties them-
selves which lead to the market failure. Altering the substantive rule
might involve imposition of an efficient solution (the solution the
parties would reach if transactions were costless) or it may involve
substituting a rule that can be altered by the parties at lower cost. If
the problem is a lack of adequate information, altering the condi-
tions of the parties would mean working to make additional infor-
mation available to the party at an informational disadvantage.
Discussion of the second approach, the spreading of information,
I will postpone for the moment. Thus far I have assumed that the
legislature is unwilling to grant the researchers any relief. But there
is also a normative argument available to show why, even if per-
suaded that the would-be experimenters have their facts right and
the objectors have their facts wrong, the government ought to hesi-
tate before imposing a solution approved by the experts and al-
lowing controversial research to go forward in the face of public
protest. Ignoring the public outcry on the ground that superior ex-
pertise points the other way is likely, in the long run, to damage the
very scientific enterprise that researchers seek to protect.
This point is best pursued by first considering a somewhat differ-
ent question: Does the University v. IV!useum example seem unreason-
able? Even without empirical testing, it should not: Popular
perception of risk, even among those who are well-educated, is re-
markably out of line with expert risk assessment.73 Consider this
question: "On average, by how many years would your life be short-
ened if all electrical power in the United States were generated by
nuclear power plants?" Based on currently available information, an
actuary would conclude that the alteration is infinitesimal - the dif-
ference would be something between one half-hour (best case) and
two days (worst case) over a lifetime. 74 But it seems a safe bet that
lay people and even many experts would offer answers that fall all
over the map - or rather, the number line. 75 Even when experts
73. See Siovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk,
in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 181, 181 (R. Schwing & W. Albers eds. 1980).
74. See Siovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Infomling People About Risk, in BANBURY RE-
PORT 6: PRODUCT LABELING AND HEALTH RISKS (L. Morris, M. Mazis, & I. Barofsky eds.
1980).
75. Admittedly, efforts to compare the hazards of different risks are not entirely fair.
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disclose the "correct" answers, public opinion may not shift much,
because, as I have explained above, the experts may not be trusted.
And so the public may once again prefer to follow the Bellman in
searching for the Snark, because he promises an easier (and
cheaper) journey - and they believe him. Trusting the experts, as
far as the public is concerned, is simply too risky. To be sure, if the
research continues and new scientific knowledge becomes part of
our cultural background - if recombinant DNA experiments be-
come as common and noncontroversial as, say, cross-breeding of
livestock -- the cost of buying off the neighbors would fall, not be-
cause the neighbors would come to trust the scientists, but because
the neighbors would in effect share the knowledge. But if the neigh-
bors cannot be bought off, the research might not continue, at least
not where the scientists want to do it, and if the research does not
continue, then the new scientific knowledge will not accrue, and
thus will not be available to cOllvince the neighbors to change their
minds.
Once upon a time, members of the public assumed that scientific
progress was inherently a good thing. The metaphor of the open
door was common: Open a door in a dark room and you bring in
more than a narrow shaft of light; you bring in light enough to
brighten the entire room. Nowadays, one might add that even after
the door is opened, some of the corners and the spaces behind the
furniture are still shrouded in shadow. The things that are thought
to dwell in those shadows - dark, ugly creatures, cackling and ca-
vorting just out of sight, obviously bent on evil - frighten people,
and the public increasingly worries that scientists, particularly those
involved in biotechnology, are starting to poke around in those dark
places.
That is the principal worry that drives transaction costs sky-high;
the worry would be exacerbated, not alleviated, imposing a "more
efficient" solution. Part of the worry involves simple fear, and part
of it involves doubts about morality. Scientists are not helped by
the fact that so few of them seem particularly skillful at making their
case to the public. 76 Only recently have scientists as a group started
From the public's perception. the degree of understanding is often as important as dry
statistics. See id.
76. In particular, the same scientists who will "frankly confess ignorance" when
speaking with their colleagues generally adopt a less equivocal altitude when addressing
lay persons. See The Science Court Proposal and Alternatives, 1978 A.B.A. SEC. BULl.. L. SCI.
& TECH. No. 17, at I (quoting Arthur Kantrowitz). As Dorothy Nelkin has pointed out,
"the way in which ... information is communicated may partly explain why public
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to evidence understanding of the nature of the political system and
.of the fact that they must live in it. Even now, many researchers
seem to regard public debate as vulgar and unprofessional. Given
that view, there is little to counter popular speculation on flying sau-
cers, telekinesis, and the emotional responses of plants to Debussy
- to say nothing of the dangers of nuclear fission or recombinant
DNA research. If public debate is beneath one's dignity, then so is
public respect.
This point is increasingly overlooked in a scholarly debate that
has become overwhelmingly policy-analytic. The government is re-
peatedly urged to impose various rules, rules that are efficient, rules
that are rational, rules with benefits outweighing their costs, all be-
cause the experts have deemed them best; convincing the suspi-
cious lay public that the rule thereby imposed is the proper one
always seems to be somebody else's job. In the biohazard debate, a
strategy that responds to a perceived market failure by awarding vic-
tory (as it would be seen by the public) to those who are disre-
spected is a strategy that in the long run will itself be disrespected.
Earlier I made brief reference to the problem of public perception,
and the public's desire that its views not be totally ignored - in
particular, that its views not be ignored in a way that makes its mem-
bers seem stupid. When this happens frequently - which is possible
if the public's lack of understanding leads to imposition of expert-
approved rules to govern research - there are serious demoraliza-
tion costs, and the public's sense of its own marginality is increased.
The long-run consequences of this demoralization could be cata-
strophic for those forms of scientific research which would not be
able to continue in the face of massive public opposition. 77
Nor should scientific researchers desire to continue their work as
though the public and its fears did not exist. Wishful thinking has
yet to solve a single human problem. Even an uninformed public
wants to feel that someone cares, and if nobody seems to, someone
must pay. Given the nature of democracy, the voters might always
rise up against their tormentors and announce that they are tired of
governance by experts and prefer to elect the Bellman. "But he'll
reach the wrong answers!" opponents might cry, to which members
of the public could well respond: "Sure, but at least he pays atten-
tion to what we think." And of course, in any society, if the people
resistance to the authority of science is so persistent." Nelkin, The Science- Textbook Contro-
versies, SCI. AM., April 1976, at 33, 39. .
77. Public demoralization might have other more imporlant costs as well, but I am
concerned here only with the likely consequences for the scientific enterprise.
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are sufficiently angered, there are cathartic remedies beyond simple
democratic change.
C. A Preliminmy Conclusion
I do not mean any of this to be taken as a diatribe against science
or against government institutions in general, and I certainly do not
mean to suggest that a contrary decision in Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Heckler would have sown the seeds of popular revolt. I use
the stark images in the preceding sections for another, more limited
purpose: I want to make plain that there may be substantial costs to
strategies that seek to bypass public opinion in the name of follow-
ing expert opinion. As long as those costs are present, scientific re-
searchers will sometimes find themselves fettered by rules of the
sort that I have been discussing. Only when viewed through the
glass of scientific rationality, however, do the rules seem ridiculous.
In the final section of the paper, I hope to show why the rules may
not be as irrational as they appear, and to advocate what I consider
the most sensible strategy for scientists to follow: Work not to get
around the public's irrationality, but instead to regain the public's
trust.
III. One Solution: Regaining the Public's Trust
The hypothetical situation, then, is this: The constitutional chal-
lenge to restrictions on scientific research has been rebuffed, and
soundly. The government has refused to impose a solution more in
line with expert thinking than those available through the market.
The scientists, in short, find themselves facing the same situation
that has confronted other groups of the powerless and oppressed
over the centuries: A conviction that their ideas are right and a re-
fusal of anyone else to believe them. I put the matter this way be-
cause I want to emphasize a commonality of interest between
scientific researchers and others who want to do things that the soci-
ety is not ready to approve. In earlier ages, these ranks have in-
cluded individuals of different races wanting to marry, women
wanting to work in "male" professions, and the devout wishing to
pursue unorthodox religious beliefs. And like those who have
struggled before them, the scientists must come to accept that when
constitutional and market failure deny them rights they consider ba-
sic, their most important task is the education of the public that
stands in their way.
The previous discussion should have laid bare my biases. I am
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not a fan of strategies for making public policy by leaving the public
in the cold. That is not to say that I am particularly fond of the
imposition of irrational rules generated by public hysteria. I tend to
be a passionate technophile, and have the deepest admiration for
scientific researchers. I am concerned, however, about the effect on
scientific enterprise if all opposition is dismissed as uninformed and
irrational. Finding a middle ground is not easy, but I would suggest
this one: If the public wants to trust a Bellman, then convince the
public to trust the right one. Convince the public that scientists can
be trusted.
In a sense, when scientists ask for removal of restrictions that they
believe short-sighted and wrong, restrictions that the larger society
has imposed in a belief that what the scientists are doing is danger-
ous, immoral, or both, the scientists are asking the public to trust
them. After all, every experiment may be said to involve noncon-
senting subjects. If the ecosystem is viewed as dynamic, all its com-
ponents constantly interacting, then everything that changes any
part will in the long run affect the whole. It is unnecessary to press
that point too strongly; the· easier argument is that many of the
most controversial experiments have undeniable effects on the rest
of the world. Some respond that if the experiment is itself safe and
if people are worried that the knowledge gained will be misused,
then they should try to control use, not discovery.78 That argument,
however, is beside the point. If people do not trust the system that
will exploit the knowledge, they have no choice but to strike at the
knowledge itself. 79 That choice may in its turn seem irrational, im-
moral, or unconstitutional, but it flows from an impulse that is per-
78. One of the most elegant formulations of the "no moral responsibility" argument
is this one by a Nobel Laureate:
Science has two aims: to increase knowledge by penetrating into the secrets of
Nature and to elevate human life. We scientists cannot be made responsible if the
fruits of our work have reached only a minority of our kind. As to the murderous
weapons which threaten our existence, I must also decline responsibility. Science
creates new knowledge and new knowledge creates new tools, and any tool can be
used, both for construction and destruction [sic]. It is regrettable that moral pro-
gress has lagged behind scientific progress and that the new tools created by science
are made into instruments of murder and destruction. We cannot be blamed if
groups of people snatch the discoveries from our hands, run away with them and
use them contrary to our intentions.
A. SZENT-GYORGI, SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLITICS 42-43 (1963). OIhers have made the
same point, although less elegantly; apparently none of them has heard of the tort law
doctrine of attractive nuisance. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 59
(1984).
79. See Stone, Knowledge, Survival. and the Duties ofScience, 23 AM. V.L. REV. 231,253-
57 (1973) (arguing that given fallibility of humanity'S political institutions, dichotomy
between knowledge and its application may be false).
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fectly understandable: Fear. The fear m~y be of physical danger, it
may be of drastic societal change, it may be of an alteration in the
way we view ourselves and our world, or it may be of something else
altogether, but it is fear nevertheless that motivates the desire to
rein in scientific experimentation.
The most controversial experiments - especially those involving
recombinant DNA - are of course the ones with respect to which
the cost of obtaining information is most likely to be so high that
few members of the lay public will be capable of making truly ra-
tional analyses of their self-interest.80 These experiments, which the
lay public does not understand and therefore fears, are the most
likely targets of government regulation. Something very much like
this has contributed to the near-destruction of the nuclear power
industry in the United States: The public's fears have led to in-
creased regulation, thus driving up the cost of nuclear power gener-
ation,8l even though other industries, sharing many of the same
problems regulated in the nuclear industry, are left relatively un-
touched. True, some public fears about nuclear energy -long-term
effects on the gene pool of increased background radiation, for ex-
ample, and the problems of storage of nuclear waste - are unique
to the industry, but regulation of those aspects is only a small part of
what is making nuclear energy generation so expensive.82 A fearful
public, however, seems to believe that any additional regulation of
nuclear energy is worthwhile, and as long as that is the public mood,
the regulatory cost will continue to mount.
The same may happen ultimately to biotechnology, and for much
the same reason: The public is concerned and the scientists are un-
able to make a convincing and public case that the concerns are irra-
tional. There are some who fear that any experiments with
recombinant DNA constitute a threat to the public health and safety,
that the processes involved in the modification of life carry the una-
voidable risk that (quite by accident) a dangerous, perhaps uncon-
trollable microorganism will be created. Most researchers discount
these fears, but the reality of such concerns, not their rationality, is
their politically relevant characteristic. Other members of the public
80. An individual's self-interest may include moral as well as physical fears, but no
matter what is included, the rationality of the calculation will almost always be enhanced
when based on more information.
S!. Sfe, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 73.1 (a)( I) (1985) (protection required against terrorist at-
tack); id. § 73.55 (same); id. § 100.10 (c) and App. A (practical invulnerability to eanh-
quake required).
82. Sff gel/emil)' Cook, .Vue/ear Follies, FORBES, Feb. II, 1985, at 82.
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- and even a few experts - seek controls not because of the bio-
logical dangers, but because of what might be called the political or
moral dangers should technology be developed to permit significant
alterations in human genetic inheritance: "If it doesn't escape from
the laboratory and kill us, somebody will take it from the laboratory
and use it to change us." To dismiss such concerns as uninformed
quite misses the point: The fears may exist because the public is
uninformed, but they may also exist because an adequately in-
formed public differs with the scientific community either in moral
judgment or in prediction about the future. In either event, the pol-
icy question surely is not whether the fears are .sensible or not, but
what to do about them.
Of course scientific research does produce some dangers, often
indirectly as the fruits of the research are put to use. Some of them
we see or breathe every day. Others are more insidious. Relatively
few moral philosophers deny to organized society the right to pro-
tect itself, and in an activist state, the right is exercised more fre-
quently, sometimes even when nobody but concerned members of
the public perceives any risk at all. Some protections from the fruits
of science, when those fruits threaten health, have gained wide-
spread public acceptance and support. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the many statutes establishing its mandate come
immediately to mind.83 Some communities have tried to ban the
shipment of nuclear materials through their streets.84 Cambridge,
Massachusetts, has placed some restrictions on recombinant DNA
research.85 Berkeley, California, made a short-lived effort to ban
electroshock therapy.86.
Scientists have responded to all of this in various ways, but they
have generally focused their resources on the lobbying strategy I
mentioned above, trying to convince legislators and administrators
that if restrictions on inquiry, at least, are carried too far, the "end-
83. I do nOl mean 10 suggesl lhal lhe Environmental Proleclion Agency and ilS en-
abling SlalUles really do work consislently for lhe cause of beller public health. bUl I do
believe lhal lhe perceplion lhal lhey do so explains lhe overwhelming supporl lhey en-
joy among members of lhe lay public.
84. Compare N.Y. Times. OCI. 16, 1984. al 83. col. 5 (describing Opposilion 10 plans
10 ship nuclear wasIl' lhrough New York Cily) with N.Y. Times, Dec. 4. 1984, al A24. col.
I (U.S. Dep'l of Transp. rules lhal local officials lack authorily 10 implement a ban).
85. Cambridge, Mass.. Ordinance No. 947. Final Publicalion No. 2069 (No\'. 3,
1980); sel' Swazey. Sorenson & Wong. Risks and BI'IIPjits. Rights and Rl'spollSibilitil's:.-I Histor)'
of thl' Rl'combinant D.\".-l RPSearch Con t1"01 II'TSY, 51 S. CAL. L. RE\'. 1019. 1057-61 (1978)
(describing hislory of Cambridge ordinance); CullilOn, Recombinant D.\".-I: Cambridgl' Coun-
cil rotes .\Ioratorium. 193 SCIENCE 300 (1976).
86. SI'I' N.Y. Times,Jan. 15. 1983. al 12. col. 4 (local judge sluck down lhe ordinance
as unconslilulional).
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less frontier" will be so tightly constrained that scientific creativity
will cease to flourish. That may be true (although I doubt that re-
strictions will soon move so far), but it has nothing to do with the
right of society to protect itself. There is no societal obligation to
encourage scientific innovation, although it may be in the interest of
society to do so. The constitutional argument, as I explained above,
seems distinctly unpromising. In short, scientists who rely on moral
suasion alone are unlikely to win their case for unrestricted inquiry.
There are, however, any number of normative arguments in favor
of relatively unfettered scientific progress, and many of these are
quite convincing. Sometimes the opened door does illuminate the
entire room; certainly the advance of technology has improved the
quality of life for most Americans. Indeed, there is something at
once amusing and distressing in the image of college students lis-
tening to' electronic music on their stereo headphones, taking antibi-
otics for their infections, flying around the country for vacations or
job interviews, playing video games, using word processing equip-
ment, making long-distance telephone calls, and watching docu-
mentary films about how horrible an animal is scientific progress.
This kind of neo-romanticism is, I think, a close cousin to some of
the driving forces behind Moral Majority and similar organizations:
It reflects' the twin desires to bring order to what cannot be under-
stood and to put moral brakes on a swiftly changing society.87
These forces play an important role in the formation of policy, but
they have no unique claim to intellectual or moral respect. Scientific
progress brings dangers, but it brings more good things than bad.
Not every assertion that something is dangerous renders it so. In-
deed, claims by bad scientists (or by nonscientists) that such-and-
such a process constitutes a threat to life or health or safety need
not even raise suspicion.
A society must protect itself, but not every bit of regulation that
might be described as "protecting life and health" deserves that de-
scription. Much of it will constitute legislation enacted for quite dif-
ferent motives. Much of it will be quite irrational. In a majoritarian
democracy, however, most of it will be valid.!!!! Legislation may be
87. In saying that the driving force is similar, I do not mean any comparison of moti-
vation or goals. Both, however, are part of what is sometimes called the "romantic" or
"neo-romantic" resistance to science. See. e.g., Nelkin, supra note 76, at 39; Marx, Reflec-
tions on the .'Ilea-Romantic Critique ofScience, in LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC INQ.UIRY, supra note 16,
at 61.
88. For my generally negative assessment of the idea that scientific irrationality
should playa role in constitutional adjudication, see Carter, Constitutional Implications,
supra note 54.
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valid and still be a bad idea. Precisely because the majority so often
rules, our political system presents a special danger that utterly irra-
tional ideas may become the law of the land. When that happens,
scientists often only bemoan or ignore altogether this facet of our
political culture. They may be tempted to seek end-runs around the
weight of public opinion; their true responsibility, however, is to do
the often dirty work of seeking to change the public's mind to elimi-
nate the fears that give rise to the legislation. The immense cost of
obtaining information will still make it impossible for the public to
share the understanding of scientists; consequently, if the public's
fears are to be calmed and its opinion changed, the education I sug-
gest must be of a particular sort: Scientists must make their case not
on an experiment-by-experiment basis, but on a far broader one.
They must educate the public to believe in their morality and in
their work; they must explain why members of the public should
trus t what the experts say. This task of working to regain the public
trust is also a means for resolving a market failure problem or a
denial of a claim of right, and it does so without insult or injury. It is
thus an ideal task for the scientific community now to undertake.
When scientific researchers ask to be free of restrictions, they are
really asking members of the public to trust them. The public may
be unimpressed, asking "Why should we trust you with our safety?"
Many scientists would give answers that boil down to: "Because
we're smarter than you are."89 While that might sometimes be true,
it is not calculated to elicit a positive response. It may in fact be the
elitism of much of the scientific establishment and the disdain in
89. See supra note 76. Members of the public may take this perceived contempt quite
personally. A particularly evocative exposition of this theme is sociologist Thomas J.
Cottle's dialogue with a poor black woman who is disturbed by her young son's interest
in pursuing a career in science. See Cottle, "Show Me A Scientist Who J Helped Poor Folks and
I'll Kiss Her Hand," in SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 216 (N. Steneck
ed. 1975). Two samples of the mother's lament:
"I blame the scientists," she said, seeing I wasn't about to speak. "I blame them all.
They're specially educated, everyone of them. Every single one of them has de-
grees, like a doctor or whatever. Just like you have." I said nothing. "They know
what's happening in America. They know the children here are dying from the lead
they eat in that paint. Scientists, doctors let that happen. Scientists don't make
cheap medicine for us "
Id. at 225.
"We're always the dogs. You mess around on us, and then you leave us to die.
But not a word comes from you, not a 'I'm sorrv.''' She walked toward me and
pushed her finger at the new'spaper I still held i~ my lap. "Three hundred black
folks gave their babies to those scientists. That means all over the country they're
experimenting. We never get to say a word about it. Or if we ask, we can't be sure
they're telling us everything that's going on. We're just your dogs waiting for you
to play your rich games. But you never show your white faces around here. You
never even say 'I'm sorry. I'm sorry for what's happening. I'm sorry that we got our
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which some of its members seem to hold the public that lie near the
heart of the profession's current problems yo To the extent that op-
position to scientific research stems from the quite different prob-
lem that the public questions the morality of the work, elitism and
disdain will do nothing to solve the problem and will likely make
matters worse.
Scientists will regain the public's trust only when they can manage
an answer on the order of: "We should have your trust because we
have earned it." Setting out to accomplish that task will not be easy,
but nothing short of it may do. If scientists instead seek end-runs to
increase their access to decision-making without appreciably alter-
ing public perceptions of risk - I have in mind not only what I have
discussed in this paper, but such proposals as the "Science Court"91
as well - they are surely doomed to failure in the long term. Cheap
though these strategies may seem, they will eventually give rise to a
bill that must be paid.92
And how are scientists to go about earning the trust of the public?
The question is not one to which the legal process can offer much
answer. The twin strategies I would recommend are public educa-
tion and scientific self-restraint.
By public education I do not mean improving the teaching of sci-
ence in the schools, although that is important as well. I mean in-
stead that scientists must take the time to explain and even justify
the more controversial things that they do. These explanations can-
not be limited to the narrow circles of the well-educated; scientists
white folks walking on the moon while you black folks are falling on your beds sick
with hunger, and your stomachs rotting.' .. ."
" ... We've been your slaves so long, it's like nothing's changed. Only now," she
said, glancing at the paper, "they call it science ...."
Id. at 227.
90. The scientific researcher making this statement would of course believe herself
to be making a descriptive statement, not a normative one. The public's mistaken per-
ception of normativity prompts the presumption of insult mentioned in the text.
91. The Science Court is the name generally given to the institution proposed nearly
twenty vears ago by Arthur Kantrowitz for resolving scientific controversies with public
policy implications. Proponents of the Science Court believe it is both possible and wise
to resolve the scientific aspect of a public policy matter without resort to the political
process. For a summary of this debate, see Carter, Separatism and SkeptiriJm, supra note 7.
92. This may be one lesson the Democratic Party should draw from its heavy e1eClo-
ral defeats in 1978, 1980, and 1984: Whether or not people agree with your policies,
they like to feel as though you care about their views, and are not satisfied with policies
that are justified on the argument, "We have the votes." See Carter, Constitutional Implira-
tio/lJ, SlLpra note 54, at 68-69. Good politicians realize this instinctively. Two years ago,
for example, then-Senator Paul Tsongas, a Massachusetts Democrat, was quoted as say-
ing: ") think we've benefited from being out in the cold fl)r four years. We're a lot less
smug, we're a lot more open to ideas. It's been a worthwhile, though unpleasant, expe-
rience." N.Y. Times, June 9, 1983, at BIO, col. 6.
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must select forums that will get their messages to those most 111
need of them - the relatively uneducated who may be afraid or the
many citizens who may doubt the morality of their work. At the
same time, the scientific community should undertake a massive
public relations offensive, trying to convince a questioning public
that the scientific way of knowing is essential to progress and, as a
corollary, to let people know just what benefits have been brought
forth by unimpeded scientific inquiry.
By self-restraint I mean something quite different, and my sugges-
tion will be a bitter pill for researchers to swallow. Much as I admire
the wonderful creed of knowledge for its own sake, the time may
have come to discard it - or at least to place it in mothballs for a
while. Perhaps I am suggesting a kind of disingenuousness, but my
intent is to recommend a more thoughtful response to the question,
"Why are you doing this research?" Scientists seeking to regain the
public trust must portray themselves as seeking knowledge for the
sake of society or of humanity. Almost any investigation can, if the
researcher tries, be justified in terms of its benefits to the world.
But applying such a standard would at least require researchers to
think through the benefits and risks of their experiments. And
should the public question the benefits, especially if public doubts
arise because of a moral judgment differing from scientific consen-
sus, the researcher would have to try to explain in patient detail.
Should the explanation fail to convince, should public suspicion and
opposition continue to grow, the researcher might have to do what
most would consider a form of blasphemy: give up the research. To
be sure, it might eventually be resumed. But in the short term, for a
scientific community trying to convince the public that it can be
trusted, stopping the work voluntarily - as was done for a time in
the field of recombinant DNA - might shore up an image of a sci-
ence responsive to public concern, and should in any event be infi-
nitely preferable to later government intervention.
These, then, are some of the ways in which scientists might try to
regain the public's trust, and no doubt there are many others that
will occur to the sensitive reader. But until these or other means are
pursued, it may well be that when the public demands of the scien-
tists, "Why should we trust you with our safety?," scientists will have
no response other than:
"Perhaps you shouldn't."
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IV. .1 Final Word
Vol. 3:358, 1985
I opened my analysis with a discussion of the hunt for the Snark,
and I would like to close with it as well. Most of my cautions have
been aimed at the scientific community, but my concluding caution
points in quite a different direction. Following the Bellman and his
perfectly blank map, the crew finally discovered the hiding place of
the creature. At least, they thought they had discovered it: Thing-
um-a-jig,u:\ the crew member who found it, did not survive his tri-
umph; after announcing his discovery, he realized that he had per-
haps discovered not a Snark after all, but the far more dangerous
BoojumY4 And like everyone who ever found a Boojum, the
wretched Thing-um-a-jig softly and suddenly vanished away and
never was met with againY5 Nor was the Snark - or was it a
Boojum? - actually seen by any other member of the crew. Here,
then, Carroll may have been sending his readers another message:
Following its own blank map, without the guidance of experts, the
crew ended up losing one of its members, and could never say for
sure whether it had reached its goal.
In that, too, is a lesson for someone.
93. For those who may recall from my discussion above, see supra text accompanying
note 9, that every member of the crew has a name beginning with the letter "B," I
should explain that Thing-um-a-jig, whose other names include "Candle-Ends" and
"Toasted-Cheese," is also the Baker. Snark, supra note 8, at 184.
94. Jd. at 206. Cf id. at 191 (dangers of Boojum).
95. The poem concludes with this stanza:
In the midst of the word he was trying to say,
In the midst of his laughter and glee,
He had softly and suddenly vanished away -
For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.
Jd. at 206.
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